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section, the author describes the key social partners and institutions o f  the LRS 
in the countries participating in an international research project carried out in 
2003-2006. The second section o f  the paper deals with the particular features o f  
the LRS in the SME sector. The strong “informality ” o f  social dialogue is the 
key institutional pattern o f  LRS in the SME sector.
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Foreword
The aim of the project supported by the Leonardo programme of the European 
Commission was to develop a research-based international comparative training 
curriculum about the SME sectors in eight European participant countries: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. The 
results of the fist project phase is summarised in a Comparative Report (CR). 
This analysis is focusing on the such social regulatory institutions of firms’ 
behaviour as the Labour Relations System (LRS).2. Sources and forms of a 
firm's competitive advantage -  literature review.
2.4. National level concertation and consultation institutions
The review of the various coordination forms of wage bargaining calls attention 
to the active role of national governments in influencing the outcomes of these 
bargaining. Evaluating the degree of government intervention in wage 
bargaining, we used the following 5-point scale measurement (Industrial 
Relations in Europe, 2005: 52.). 1 Assessing the degree of government 
intervention in wage bargaining in the Leonardo countries, the results show 
considerable variations. The highest scores were reached in Belgium (4.1) and in 
France (3.1), followed by Hungary (3.0). The lowest level of government 
intervention was registered in such countries as the UK (1.2), Germany (1.9) and 
Spain (1.9). The scores on government intervention are occupying the middle 
position in Poland (2.5) and in Slovakia (2.5). Due to the important regulatory 
role of the statutory minimum wages2, it is important to know which countries 
have such a practice. All EU-15 countries involved in the Leonardo project now 
have a minimum wage. In Belgium, minimum wage is set by national level 
collective agreements but in the other countries (France, Spain, UK), the 
minimum wage is regulated by law. Similarly to the EU-15 countries, a statutory
1 The five-point scale proposed by the report is as follows: 5 = government imposes private 
sector wage settlements or suspends bargaining (involuntary wage freeze); 4 = government 
participates directly in private sector wage-bargaining and provides norms or ceilings, or 
tax-based compensation to achieve particular outcomes (social pacts); 3 = government 
determines wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through minimum wage-setting, wage- 
setting in the public sector, or through threats o f sanction (for instance, withholding 
extension or recognition); 2 = government sets minimum wage and provides institutional 
framework for national or sectoral collective bargaining (legal protection of agreements, 
extension), consultation or dialogue (recognition and consultation). (1.5 if  only one of 
these applies); 1 = no role of government in wage-setting. (Industrial Relations in Europe, 
2004: 50.)
2 ’The (statutory) national minimum wage is can also be seen as a form of coordination, 
since it functions as a reference point for the whole wage system.’ (Industrial Relations in 
Europe, 2004: 51.)
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minimum wage was adapted in all new Member States (Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia).
The unions’ and employers’ national level representative bodies dealing with 
consultation may take the form of bipartite, tripartite or a wider membership. As 
concerning their function, they may have the following roles:
1. Advisory role
2. Consultative or negotiating role
3. Standard setting function
In relation to the various roles of this consultation bodies, we have to stress the 
particular situation related to the tripartite consultation in the post-socialist 
countries participating in the Leonardo project. Without exception, in theses 
economies the tripartite consultation and representation became institutionalised 
either on the eve or on the aftermath of the democratisation process. For 
example, the Hungary’s OET -  National Interest Reconciliation Council -  was 
established in 1987. In the case of Poland, the national forum for social dialogue 
‘Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Issues’ was established in 
1994. In Slovakia, the tripartite dialogue between the social partners (state, trade 
unions and employers’ association) has been operating for more than a decade. 
In the EU-15 countries the presence of the national bodies for consultation and 
representation is general. However, in the majority of cases, participation in 
such structures is practiced by national peak association of both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations.3 These statutory bodies which could be bipartite, 
tripartite, etc. have a role to deal with either general issues (Belgium, Hungary) 
or specific issues like social security administration (e.g. France, Germany) or 
the application of labour law and the extension of collective agreements (as this 
is the case in Germany). The next table provides a list of tripartite bodies in the 
Leonardo countries.
2.5. A highly sensitive feature of the labour relations: industrial 
actions
The number of strikes, lock-outs, sabotage, etc. as various forms of industrial 
action is one of the most high-profile characteristics of industrial relations. 
Beside the very intensive media coverage or public attention, the intensity of the 
industrial action -  measured by working days lost, number of employees 
involved, number of industrial disputes, etc. -  is an important indicator of 
whether or not labour relations systems are functioning. The intensity of 
industrial actions in itself does not reflect automatically the mal-fiinctioning but
3 Note: trade unions officers and employer representatives in the UK are appointed not as 
official representatives of their associations, but as ‘competent individuals’. (Industrial 
Relations in Europe, 2004: 53.)
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according to the other features of employment relations it may reflect even a 
well-functioning system. For example, in the later part of this section, we will 
present surprisingly low level of industrial action measured by working day lost 
by strikes per 1,000 employees in Germany (4.0) and ion Poland (2.1). Despite 
the low level of this indicator, the explanatory factors are rather different. In the 
first case (Germany), this could be attributed to the regulated nature of the 
coordinated market economy, while in Poland this phenomenon could be a 
consequence of two interrelated factors. On the one hand deterioration of the 
employees’ labour market position (two digits unemployment level), and on the 
other hand the radically weakened positions of trade unions.
Table 11. Participation o f unions and employers in tripartite bodies
Tripartite bodies
Belgium National Labour Council (CNT/NAR); various bodies at sectoral and regional 
level
France National Commission on Collective Bargaining; Unemployment insurance 
fund (UNEDIC); various social security fund-holding bodies
Germany Parity committee for extension of collective agreements; social security 
administrative boards; labour courts and labour market board
Spain Economic and Social Council (CES); National Institute o f Employment 
(INEM); State Commission for Continuing Training (CEFC)
Hungary National Interest Reconciliation Council (OET)
Poland Commission for Social and Economic Issues
Slovakia Council for Economic and Social Concertation (RHSD);Agreement 
Extension Committee
UK Participation of individual representatives in Low Pay Commission (LPC), 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC) and Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
Source: Database o f  the Institut des Sciences du Travail o f  the Universite Catholique de 
Louvain (1997-2003) on behalf o f  the Employment and Social Affairs DG o f  the European 
Commission. Quoted by Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004: 54. Table 11. is an edited 
version o f  the original one containing data only fo r  countries involved in the Leonardo 
Project.
The highest rate of working days lost by industrial action per 1,000 employees 
was registered in Spain (219.7) and followed by Hungary (60.2), France (40.5) 
and the UK (27.5). (See in details Table 12 and Figure 1.)
Table 12 highlights the following notable points:
1. The very low level of industrial action -  even absence in some years -  in 
some of new Member States (Hungary, with the exception of the year 2000 and 
Poland) and in such EU-15 country as Germany.
2. Very different patterns were registered in the broadly comparable (in size 
terms) ‘big four’ old European States like France, Germany, Spain and in the 
UK. Spain shows considerably higher level of industrial action than France, the
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UK and Germany. Though Spain appears to have experienced a rapid decline in 
working days lost by strikes from 2002 to 2003 and the fall further continues.
3. The lack of any consistent trend in the majority of countries characterised by 
figures often rising and falling from year to year.
Figure 1. Working days lost through industrial action per 1,000 employees in 
countries participating in the Leonardo project (Source: EIRO, 2005, p. 9.)
Spain
Hungary
France
UK
Germany
Poland
0 50 100 150 200 250
Working days lost
Table 12. Working days lost through industrial action
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*
Belgium n. d. n. d. 17.6 n. d. n. d.
France 54.0 45.0 32.0 31.0 n. d.
Germany 0.3 0.8 9.6 5.1 1.6
Spain 292.5 151.0 377.1 58.1 35.6
UK 20.0 20.0 51.0 19.0 34.0
Hungary 236.0 4.0 0.4 0.3 3.0
Poland 7.4 0.4 0 0.7 n. d.
*In some cases, extrapolations from partial figures only - see notes.
Source: EIRO 2005: 7.
Another important characteristic of industrial action is that it does not spread 
evenly through the various sectors of the economy. Reviewing the three sectors 
most affected by industrial action (from 2000-2004) we get the following 
picture. The sectors most affected by industrial action were ‘transport and 
communication’ (with railways often playing a leading role) and 
‘manufacturing’ (with metal working playing a prominent role). The ‘public 
sector’ in a broad sense (especially health care and social work, and education)
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follows closely the two first sectors. It is interesting to note that in Spain the 
‘construction industry’ plays a major role in industrial action following the key 
role of this sector in the Spanish economy. According to international 
experiences, private sector services are rarely involved in the top three sectors in 
the majority of countries. In Germany too, the ‘commerce-retail’ sector did not 
figure among the sectors most affected by industrial action. Unfortunately, the 
statistical data on industrial action do not always allow comparison between 
private and public sectors (in terms of ownership). Despite this methodological 
shortcoming, the share of industrial action by ownership varies considerably in 
the countries observed. Countries where a relatively high proportion of the ‘most 
strike-prone industries’ are in the public sector include France, Hungary and the 
UK. Another group of countries has the most strike-affected industries in the 
private sector; this group includes Germany and Spain. Poland and Slovakia 
present a mixed-pattem of industrial action (i.e. it is not possible to clearly 
identify either a private or public ‘dominance’ in industrial action).
Evaluating the types of sectors dominating the industrial actions in a given year, 
we found the following syndrome. For example, a single accounted for half or 
more of all working days lost in: Belgium in 2002 (manufacturing); France in 
2000-2001 (civil service); Germany 2001 and 2003 (manufacturing); Hungary in 
2001 (non-commercial services).
Finally, it is necessary to identify the main causes of industrial actions. 
Evaluating the three main reasons for industrial actions in the countries 
participating in the Leonardo project (2000-2004), unsurprisingly, the number 
one reason for industrial action is unquestionably pay. It features among the 
leading issues in all countries, but especially in Spain. Pay is consistently the 
leading single issue in industrial action in France, in Hungary, in Poland and in 
the UK. Employment is the next most important cause for industrial action in 
Slovakia which could be attributed to the extremely high level (two digits) 
unemployment. In relation to the unemployment, we may note that dismissals 
are prominent in the UK, redundancies and job losses are the main source of 
industrial conflicts in France, Hungary and Poland. Plant closures and 
company’s restructuring which are important reasons for industrial actions in 
Hungary, probably also fall under the broad heading (employment). The next 
most common reasons are broadly political issues concerned with generic or 
specific (e.g. social security, labour law reforms, privatisations and sector 
restructuring) government policies being the main reasons for such actions both 
in Slovakia and in Hungary. Political issues are often the source of industrial 
actions in Spain. Working time and working conditions are the last factors 
ranking among the motives of industrial actions in France and in the UK. Table 
13 provides a general overview of reasons for industrial actions by country.
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Table 13. Main causes o f  industrial action in the Leonardo project’s countries
WEIGHT Effective number of
confederations
Country Year 1 2 3
Belgium n. d. n. d. n. d.
2000 Pay (33%) Working time (29%) Working conditions (15%)
2001 Pay (37%) Job losses (21%) Working time (15%)
France 2002 Pay (39%) Job losses (29%) Working conditions (21%)
2003 Pay (37%) Job losses (27%) Working conditions (20%)
Germany n. d. n. d. n. d.
2000
Not arising from 
collective 
bargaining (57%)
Issue not strictly linked 
to employment 
relationship (24%)
Arising from collective 
bargaining (19%)
2001
Not arising from 
collective 
bargaining (69%)
Arising from collective 
bargaining (31%) -
Spain 2002
Issue not strictly 
linked to 
employment 
relationship (88%)
Arising from collective 
bargaining (6%)
Not arising from 
collective bargaining 
(5%)
2003
Arising from 
collective 
bargaining (63%)
Not arising from 
collective bargaining 
(37%)
-
2004*
Arising from 
collective 
bargaining (87%)
Not arising from 
collective bargaining 
(12%)
Issue not strictly linked 
to employment 
relationship (2%)
2000 Pay (77%) Redundancy (11%) Staffing and work allocation (5%)
UK
2001
Working conditions 
and supervision 
(33%)
Pay (27%) Redundancy (17%)
2002 Pay (89%) Working conditions and supervision (8%) Redundancy (1%)
2003 Pay (84%) Working time (13%) Staffing and work allocation (1%)
2004 Pay (84%) Redundancy (12%) Working time (2%)
2000 Pay Plant closures -
2001 Pay Plant closures -
Hungary 2002 Pay Privatisation Plant closures
2003 Pay Plant closures Job losses
2004 Pay Privatisation Job losses
Poland 2003 Wage arrears Job losses .2004 Wage arrears Privatisation -
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2001 Pay Employment -
Slovakia
2002 Labour law reforms Government social policy and budget -
2003 Rail restructuring Overall government policy -
2004 Transport subsidies Pay -
♦First 8 months
Source: EIRO, 2005
3. Actors and institutions: an international comparison focusing 
in the SME sector
The previous sections gave a general overview of the social actors and 
institutions (trade unions and employers’ associations, collective bargaining -  
with a special focus on wage bargaining, employees’ representation and 
participation, tripartite consultation and concertation bodies, etc.) which may 
play a benchmarking role for SMEs in relation to labour relation standards. We 
are aware that it is not possible to copy in a mechanical way actors and 
institutions of labour relations functioning in medium- and large-scale firms, 
therefore we suggest to use the so-called ‘intelligent or reflexive benchmarking’ 
instead of a mechanical version of it.4 The other important issue reviewed in the 
previous section was related to the similar and distinctive characteristics of the 
labour relations system between the EU-15 countries and the new Member 
States involved in the Leonardo Project.
The analysis of the importance and dynamism of the SME sector has frequently 
highlighted their significant contribution to job creation. For example, the 
second chapter indicated that both at the EU- and individual country-level SMEs 
generate at least two thirds of employment. The factors explaining the 
employment generating capacity of SMEs are the following:
1. Increasing share of the ‘service sector’ within the economy in which SMEs 
are dominant in comparison with the industrial sector.
4 “Reflexive benchmarking or intelligent benchmarking as it is also called is less about 
deciding ‘what is best’ or ‘what universal truth’ can be derived from comparison. The 
identification of best practice is not a primary goal of reflexive benchmarking; instead it 
has to do with getting to know more about various institutional solutions in different 
economic structures. Particularly, in a situation o f fundamental transformation processes, 
mechanistic benchmarking is hardly possible, as institutions are becoming increasingly 
fragile. The aim of reflexive benchmarking is to be able to gain a better understanding of 
one’s own solutions, their strengths and weaknesses, when seen in the light of what others 
do, and what options they see. Such an understanding can cause policy-makers to assess 
institutional solutions of their own system much more critically and may help them to 
deliberately imagine and act on different strategies.” Schienstock. 2004: 18.
274 JEEMS 3/2006
Research Note
2. The tendency for ‘de-mergers’ of large firms speed up of outsourcing of non­
core activities, a variety of different forms of organisation disagregation became 
increasingly common and this process results in the shift of the importance of 
the SME sector.
3. SMEs are predominant in certain new economic sectors such as new media, 
software development, etc.
4. The dynamism of ‘industrial clusters’ or ‘industrial districts’ or ‘growth 
poles’ representing old and new forms of network type cooperation 
characterising both the Old and the New Economy. In this type of cooperation, 
SMEs are playing key role.
This is not at all a new phenomenon. ‘The developing entrepreneurship pillar of 
the Commission’s 1999 Employment Guidelines states that: «The development 
of new enterprises, and the growth of SMEs, is essential for hob creation. This 
process must be promoted by encouraging greater entrepreneurial awareness 
across society, by providing a clear, stable and predictable set of rules (...) The 
Member States should also reduce and simplify the administrative and tax 
burdens on SMEs.»
Despite of the intensive interest regarding SMEs, the quality of our knowledge 
about labour relations within this sector seems to be generally low. The aim of 
this section is to identify some characteristics and recent developments in the 
labour relation practices of SMEs, with a special focus on collective bargaining, 
relationships among employers and employees and employees’ participations. 
The issues investigated include.
1. Collective bargaining coverage rate in the SMEs.
2. Employees’ direct representative organisations (e.g. works council).
3. Employers’ and trade unions’ attitudes towards labour relations institutions: 
individualisation and informality of employer-employee relationship.
3.1. Collective bargaining in the SMEs: coverage rate and procedures
The national system of Labour Relations reviewed in the previous sections is an 
important factor in shaping the position of SMEs with regard to bargaining 
coverage. As might be expected the coverage rate of collective bargaining in the 
SME sector is higher in those countries which, despite the recent tendencies 
towards decentralisation, still have a more centralised bargaining structure, like 
in France, Germany and Spain participating in the Leonardo project. In these 
countries collective agreements signed at national or sectoral level tend to be 
applied in small enterprises as well as in larger ones, because such agreements 
may be extended to become binding on all companies in a sector, whether 
members of the signatory organisation or not, and regardless of size (e.g. in 
France). In Spain, SMEs are covered by collective agreements in the same way 
as other companies since sectoral agreements are applicable to all companies 
and workers in an industry and not only to members of the signatory
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organisations (however, labour relations experts and trade unions doubt whether 
sectoral agreements are actually implemented in the majority of small firms).
Following the logic of interdependency of centralised or decentralised character 
of the national labour relation system and the bargaining coverage rate in the 
SMEs, it is not surprising that the coverage rate in the SMEs is extremely low in 
the UK. In this country the labour relation system is voluntaristic or deregulated. 
When we want to quantify the bargaining coverage rate in the SME sector, only 
a limited amount of data is available and therefore these are scarcely 
comparable. This is true in the case of our project too. In spite of these 
methodological difficulties, we may identify the following common patterns. 
There is a direct relationship between the company size and collective 
bargaining coverage rate. As the size of the companies increases, so does the 
bargaining coverage rate. In the smaller firms, and especially in those with fewer 
than 20 employees, collective bargaining coverage is the exception. The size- 
category effect’ is valid in the Hungarian case too, as an example, see the 
following table.
Table 14. Collective bargaining by company size (1998)
Size categories of firms Share of companies with collective
(num ber of employees) agreements
5-20 persons1 0.1%
20-49 persons 1.1%
50-299 persons 11.7%
300-499 persons 46.4%
500-999 persons 67.3%
1000 and more 75.4%
Source: Neumann 2002: 6
1Data on collective bargaining is often not available in the case o f  firms employing less than 
four persons.
3.2. Collective representation structure in the SME sector: the case of works 
councils
As far as the establishment of works councils is concerned, in all European 
countries -  with the exception of Sweden -  there is a minimum workforce-size 
threshold for the creation of this institution of participation. In the Leonardo 
Project countries, the lowest threshold for works councils’ establishment is in 
Germany, with 5 employees; in France, Hungary and Spain it is 50 and in 
Belgium 100. In UK there is no general or statutory system of information and 
consultation. Beside the ‘threshold’ the other essential feature of works councils 
is the following: whether these institutions of employees’ participation are 
established automatically in all establishments satisfying the threshold criteria or 
must be triggered (or initiated) by the social actors of labour relations (e.g. 
employees, trade unions or employers). The establishment process is basically 
automatic in Belgium and France but in the majority of the countries must be
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initiated by employees/trade unions; e.g. as in Hungary, Germany, Poland and 
Spain.
In spite the fact that the minimum size in some countries do not exist or in the 
majority of the countries involved in the Leonardo Project, the threshold is 5, 50 
or 100 employees -  these workforce-sizes are covering the small and medium­
sized firms, the works councils are important participatory forum for employees 
in the large firms (LSE). Even the law provides basis for works councils in such 
countries as Germany, France, Hungary and Spain, in the SMEs only tiny 
minority of firms establishes works councils. “In Germany, for example, the law 
provides statutory rights in firms with five or more employees. The 
establishment of a works council is not mandatory and according to survey 
figures from 2002, works councils cover just 11 % of all firms and 50 % of all 
employees within the law’s scope. Coverage is related to the size and the age of 
the firm, with smaller and newer firms much less likely to have established a 
works council....In France, the Ministry of Labour estimates that of small firms 
(10-19 employees) less than 20 % have a form of workplace representation for 
employees. This percentage increases to 56 % for firms with 20-49 employees 
and to 90 % in firms with more than 50 employees.” (Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2004:22.) The situation is rather similar in Hungary. However, the 
relation between the size of the firms and works councils call attention to 
another vital issue. The rate of the presence of the works councils has strong 
relations with the trade union presence in the firms surveyed. According to the 
date of a statistically representative survey carried out in 2002 in Hungary, the 
share of works councils, trade unions and collective agreements are indicating 
the similar trend: their share is increasing with the size of the firms. (See Table 
15!)
Table 15. Distribution o f  works councils, trade unions and collective agree­
ments by size category o f firms in the manufacturing sector in Hungary (2002)
Size of the 
(persons)
firm N° of responders
Works councils
N° %
Trade Unions
N° %
Collective
agreements
N° %
50-99 1,082 288 27 261 26 243 23
100-249 882 456 52 389 46 359 41
Moe than 249 632 531 84 511 82 469 74
Total 2,596 1,275 1,161 1,071
Source: Benyo, B. A munkavallaldi reszvetel intezmenye: az tizemi tanacsok helyzete 
Magyarorszagon, (Institution o f  Emplyees' Participation: Situation o f  Works Councils in 
Hungary), PhD Dissertation, Budapest: Budapest University o f  Economic Sciences and 
Business Administration -  Department o f  Social Policy and Sociology, p. 75.
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3.3. Employers’ (employers’ organisations’) and trade unions’ attitudes 
towards labour relation institutions in the SME sector
Employers’ organisations generally view favourably the fact that small firms, 
unlike their larger counterparts, represent a high level of flexibility in regulating 
the employment relationship. This high level of flexibility is the main factor 
responsible for their economic success. Employers’ organisations are in favour 
of even further deregulation of SMEs. See two examples of this attitude of 
employers’ organisations towards SMEs in the following box.
Box 4. Employers ’ organisations and SMEs
Most UK employers’ associations have traditionally preferred a deregulatory 
approach to industrial relations. Since the current Labour Party government 
made public in 1998 its various proposals for legislation to provide a minimum 
floor of employment rights, employers’ associations have lobbied for the 
legislation to be watered down, especially where it applies to SMEs. Thus, for 
instance, firms with under 20 employees have been removed from the scope of 
proposed trade union recognition regulations.
In France, employers’ organisations, and particularly the SME-specific CGPME, 
have demanded that social security contributions levied on SMEs should be 
reduced, and that they should be given more flexibility by alleviating their legal 
obligations, simplifying bureaucratic procedures, and raising the thresholds for 
obligatory employee representation.
Source: EIRO 1999: 10________________________________________________
However, in some cases the employers are positive towards trade union 
activities, especially in sectors which have a strong institutional heritage of 
collective interest representation, as shown by the example of a Belgian 
employer operating in the construction sector:
Box 5. Belgian construction sector company, 100 employees
“I totally agree that my workers are members of a trade union. They need to have 
their rights defended. But dialogue needs to be always the main way of 
communication. In our company there are also many ways of informal contact; 
we go and have a drink together regularly, for instance. There is an open 
atmosphere.” (owner/employer)
In spite of the favourable opinion of employers’ organisations concerning small 
firms, these associations have various problems in the SME sector. In terms of 
their own membership among the SMEs, mainstream employers’ organisations 
often face several problems. For example, in Germany a key issue is the 
representation of the interests of SMEs. According to the survey results, 
important segments of the small firm sector feel that they are not represented in 
the traditional employers’ associations.
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In relation to the trade unions’ attitudes towards SMEs, the mainstream opinion 
is as follows. They have difficulties in creating both workplace interest 
representation institutions (e.g. collective bargaining) and employees’ 
participation structure (e.g. works councils) especially in smaller firms. The 
opinion of a Hungarian trade union leader interviewed in the clothing industry 
sector summarises well the difficulties of implementing collective interest 
representation structures in the workplace in the post-socialist economies of the 
NMS countries.
Box 6. Hungarian trade union o f  workers in the Garment trade
“When big clothes factories closed down many people registered themselves for 
unemployment benefit, but at the same time they started working in the black 
economy. It is hard to make these people understand what disadvantages they 
can suffer without being registered employees because until they have no other 
alternatives they will not leave their black sector job. Frightening them with the 
ghost of being without a pension and health insurance is fairly useless until they 
are forced somehow to deal with this question. Many of those who are 
employed in the black economy are retired or have this as a part-time or a 
second job. This system works reasonably well as long as employers pay 
correctly, but alongside this there are many unstable elements. (...) The badly 
defined job contracts and unregistered salaries press employers to exclude any 
third party from the relationship between themselves and the employees. This 
often leads to the high vulnerability of workers. “Many people who contact us 
report delayed or unpaid salaries.” (Vice President)_________________________
In addition, in the case of post-socialist (NMS) countries involved in the 
Leonardo project, the company case studies indicated intention of 
owners/managers of small firms to individualise employment relationships with 
their workers was in line with the ambition of their employees too. This latter 
phenomenon can be attributed to employees’ lack of trust towards their trade 
unions and due to the informal character of the employer-employee relationship.
In relation to the trade unions’ role in the SME sector, the issue of worker 
protection in smaller firms is important in the EU-15 countries too. For example, 
Belgian trade unions are seeking to have the thresholds for the creation of 
various representative structures or the application of other employment rights 
lowered. It is interesting to note that the French trade unions are acting to reduce 
inequalities of working an employment conditions between employees of SMEs 
and larger sized companies. In the UK the Trade Union Council (TUC) has 
campaigned during the 1980s and 1990s for the establishment of minimum 
standards in the work place, including for SMEs. Another recent British 
initiative to strengthen the trade union presence at firm level is the Union 
Learning Fund (ULF). This fund was established in 1998 by the new Labour 
Government with the purpose of involving trade unions in the government’s 
lifelong learning programme. Money is provided that generates capacity-
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building by these trade unions to encourage and enable learning that promotes 
employability and inclusion for individuals, and helps employers with 
productivity and competitiveness. The most obvious manifestation of this 
capacity-building has been the creation of Union Learning Representatives 
(ULRs), who, since 2002, have the same rights as other workplace trade union 
representatives, such as shop stewards. Working with employers, the function of 
these ULRs is to facilitate and encourage employees to participate in learning. It 
has been suggested that these ULRs offer “potentially the most significant 
statutory role for workplace unionism since the recognition of health and safety 
representatives in the mid-1970s [and] may have the potential for furthering 
union revitalisation.” (Warhurst 2005:2)
For the opinion of employers and employees on Labour Relation institutions, see 
the following box containing quotations from the company case studies.
The interviews quoted above from the company case studies indicate the low 
awareness or the lack of need both on the part of employers and employees for 
the establishment and role of official institutions and collective actors of Labour 
Relations. The lack of official institutions of labour relations does not mean a 
lack of social consent between the actors involved in the labour process. In other 
words, we have to stress the informality o f  employment relations and the rather 
paternalistic pattern o f management in the firms surveyed. In addition we have 
to note that in the ICT sector where the smooth communication and the 
employees expressed their interest in a more intensive participation in the work- 
related decision-making. For example, the lack of involvement which employees 
criticised in the managerial decisions is reflected by the following opinion of a 
manager working in the Hungarian interactive media company.
Conclusions
The presentation of the main actors and institutions of Labour Relations System 
(LRS) is in the focus of analysis carried out in this paper.
Comparing the key patterns of LRS at European level, it is worth noting that in 
the majority of countries -  with the exception of the U.K. -  the so-called ’dual­
channel system’ is functioning; in addition to the trade unions a separate 
institution of employees’ participation does exist. In relation with the trade 
union membership (’density rate’) the highest rate was registered in Belgium 
(55.8 %) and the lowest in France (9.7 %). For the trade union structure 
(’organisational comprehensiveness’) single or dominant peak organisation 
(confederation) were found in Germany, Slovakia and the U.K. In the remaining 
countries fragmented union structure (by occupation and political divide) was 
identified.
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Box 7. Mixed opinions o f  employers and employess on the firm level labour 
relations is selected contries:
Palish ICT firm, 120 employees
There are no trade unions in the firm (and never were). In the intervewee’s 
opinion, there is no need for the existence of such a representation for 
employees, because “as the employers, we try to fulfill our obligations 
towards our employees consistently”. The owner thinks that trade unions 
should function; however, "they should be created outside the firm ’s 
s tr u c tu r e s There are neither informal employees’ groups nor individuals 
representing the whole staff.
Polish funeral service firm, 64 employees
No workers’ organization exists in the enterprise; there are no trade unions. 
Trade unions are viewed by the owner as a threat to the functioning of the 
enterprise ( “I f  there were trade unions I  would have to finish my activity. 
Firstly, the firm is too small, and secondly, it could not survive the trade 
unionists ’ economic demands ”). The existence of trade unions is also viewed 
as an obstacle in the present functioning of the firm (“I f  trade unions had 
developed, I  would have to negotiate, discuss things etc. I  would not be able 
to concentrate on the firm ’s management"). At the same time, there is no 
representative of the whole staff of the enterprise. The entrepreneur is of the 
opinion that maintaining individual contacts with all the employees is 
sufficient.
Polish tourist company, 23 employees
The company studied has no official trade union representation. There is also 
no one who, informally, might represent the staff. It is the view of the owner 
that there is neither such a need nor any desire on the part of employees. 
“This is a small company. Employees can turn to me at any time. The door is 
always open for them. Moreover, they are all aware o f  the fact that I  did not 
build this company at their expense, at the expense o f  their earnings. I  meet 
my obligations with respect to employees 100%. ” (owner/employer)
Hungarian clothing company, 6 employees
The following opinion can be said to be typical: ‘7  do not think we need trade 
unions, we can handle things informally. I f  we cannot we can still quit and 
choose to be home-workers, "(employee, sewer)
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Spanish food company, 165 employees on average, but 320 in the summer 
season
“At the moment, we don’t have any conflict. Over the five years that I ’ve been 
here, there hasn’t been any conflict on the labour level. There is no trade 
union. I don 7 know i f  this gives us advantages or not. The CCOO, the UGT 
have been here... but they didn’t hold a meeting. Sometimes this brings us 
problems in respect o f labour risks... I ’m not going to tell you that the 
relations are too good, because nothing is ever too good, but we can’t 
complain and this is also reflected in the proper working o f the company. On 
a labour level, the company works extremely well and also, more than ever, in 
one o f  the most important aspects: the daily working atmosphere. We also 
have to bear in mind that this is a small town. The people who work here are 
familiar, they know each other... and i t ’s normal for there to be a relationship 
on the work level and also on the level o f the town. An influencing factor in 
the good atmosphere is that the friendly atmosphere has always been here ” 
(employer)
Spanish tourist company, 3 employees
“Monica and I  don’t have what you would call a purely boss-employee 
relationship. We worked together at another company for some time, so our 
relationship is more like two heads are better than one. And together we will 
be able to achieve more than a single person. There is a lot o f trust and 
confidence, and I ’ve asked her opinion on all o f the changes that I  have 
thought about making, and other times she has convinced me that it would be 
better to do something else that I  hadn’t thought of. I  think that the 
relationship has to be like that. It doesn’t mean that if  everything up until now 
has been white, it is now going to be green. And I  even think that it is better 
for her. Since we spend so many hours together and have hit it o ff so well, 
when she has to do something, she doesn’t have to ask my permission or ask 
what I  think i f  she does it -  the final cause is going to be the same as i f  I  had 
decided myself She has demonstrated to me that she is a total professional 
and knows how to do things, and I  have fu ll confidence in whatever she does” 
(owner/employer)
Box 8. Hungarian ICT company, 62 employees
“Compared with my previous workplace it is a very bad thing that here we 
don’t know where we are going. We give a lot of information to the 
management, but they inform us sometimes just at the last minute. Often in a 
given situation we don’t know what to do to help the company’s long-term 
aims.” (digital media manager)
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In this relation it is necessary to mention that trade union movement in the EU- 
15 countries is characterised by the trend of merger, while in the NMS it is still 
de-concentration and fragmentation take place. Similar pattern was observed in 
the employers’ side in concentrating functions to improve the quality of services 
of their member organisations. Collective bargaining (CB) is the core institution 
of the LRS which shows stability and the coverage rate of which is twice as high 
than the union density rate. The CB coverage rate is higher in the EU-15 
countries in comparison with the countries in the NMS. Evaluating the key 
source of the European wide industrial dispute we may say that wages or salaries 
are in the centre of conflicts between employers and employees and their 
respective interest representative associations. As a result of the decentralisation 
of LRS in the last decades, the ’locus’ of the wage-bargaining is the firm. This 
pattern is similar between EU-15 and NMS, with the exception of Slovakia. 
Beside the decentralisation of wage bargaining, we have to call the attention to 
another important characteristic of the wage bargaining: the explicit or implicit 
form of its coordination. In this respect the following three groups should be 
distinguished: only Belgium maintained and reintroduced some forms of explicit 
coordination at national level, in Germany and Spain -  where central agreements 
have set guidelines for wage conduct since 2001 -  the implicit coordination has 
taken place between the social partners. Implicit coordination characterises the 
French wage-bargaining procedures. Finally, in the U.K., similarly to Poland, 
both national and sector level coordination are missing.
In relation with the national level concertation and consultation, variety of 
institutional arrangements was found in countries surveyed. The government 
intervention is the strongest in France and the weakest in the U.K. The 
government, trade unions and employers’ national level representative bodies 
dealing with consultation, may take the form of bipartite, tripartite or a wider 
participation. In the EU-15 countries, the presence of the national bodies for 
consultation and representation is general. In the majority of cases, participation 
in such institutions is practiced by national peak associations of both trade 
unions and employers’ organisations. The statutory bodies which could be 
bipartite, tripartite etc. deal with general issues (e.g. in Belgium and Hungary) or 
specific issues such as social security administration (e.g. in France and 
Germany) or with the application of labour law and extension of collective 
agreements (as in the case of Germany).
The ’industrial actions’ mentioned above are highly sensible characteristic of 
the LRS. However, the intensity of industrial actions in itself does not reflect 
automatically a malfunctioning labour relations system. The indicator such as 
number of working days lost by strikes per 1000 employees expresses functional 
distortion in this system. Comparing the available indicators (in the year of 
investigation: 2004) in the countries participating in the Project the following 
rank-of-order was identified: (1) Spain (219.7 days), (2) Hungary (60.2 days),
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France (50.5 days), the UK: (27.5 days) and finally Germany (4 days) and 
Poland (2 days). When comparing countries characterised by the broadly 
comparable size, the ’big four’ old EU countries (France, Germany, Spain and 
the U.K.) are representing at least two groups of countries: Spain has a 
considerably higher frequency of industrial actions in comparison with France, 
the U.K. and Germany. However, it is necessary to note that even in Spain, a 
rapid decline in working days lost by strikes was registered in the period 
between 2002 and 2003 and this fall is continuing.
Describing the roles of LRS in the SME sector -  both European and country 
level -  special attention was devoted to issues such as collective bargaining, 
collective representation and the attitudes of employers and trade unions towards 
to the LRS. Firstly, we intend to stress that there is a direct relationship between 
the company size and collective bargaining coverage rate: as the size of firm 
increases, so does the bargaining coverage rate. In the smaller firms, especially 
in those with fewer than 20 employees, collective agreements are exception. 
Secondly, in the case of such institution of employees’ collective representation 
-  with the exception of Sweden -  in all EU-15 countries there is a minimum- 
workforce-size threshold for establishment of Works Councils (WC). In relation 
with the countries participating in the Leonardo Project, the lowest threshold for 
the creation of WC is in Germany: 5 employees, followed by France, Hungary 
and Spain with 50 employees and in Belgium 100. In the U.K. there is no 
general or statutory system of information and consultation. Additionally, it is 
worth noting that beside the size of the firm, the acceptance of WC has a close 
relationship with the presence of trade unions in the firm. Finally, in relation 
with the employers’ attitudes towards trade unions, we may say that they prefer 
the flexible employment relations -  as a main source of their economic success -  
and have rather unfavourable opinions. In the company case studies the positive 
employers’ opinion on the trade union presence was the exception. Even some 
cases, employees themselves have rather ambivalent opinion on the necessity of 
the trade unions on the workplace. Instead, they preferred the individual and 
informal arrangements based social consent with the employers which is 
consistent with the paternalistic style” of management in the firms surveyed.
ANNEX 1 LEONARDO Community Vocational Training 
Action Programme,
(2003-3448/001-00l-LE2_OREF, Contract start date: 01. October 2003, Duration 36 
Months (01. 10. 2003 -  30. 09. 2006)
Partners:
Belgium: EHSAL, Brussels
France: Universite Paris X, Nanterre
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Germany: Wismar University; Wismar
Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of
Sciences; Budapest
Poland: Institute of Labour and Social Studies; Warsaw
Spain: UNED; Madrid
Slovakia: Institute for Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences;
Bratislava
UK: University of Luton, Luton
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